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　　　　 Part 1:　Introduction
　　　　　　　 Enl ightenment,  Modern, and 
Postmodern Steps: From Texts to 
Textual Analysis to Contextual 
Analysis
Facts are stones. Some stones are used to build 
great edifices. Others are broken up to gravel 
roadways. Many are used as weapons.
Foundational ideas of modern thought, on 
topics ranging from the science of perception to 
transformation of moral philosophy, owe much to 
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Enlightenment reformulation of earlier notions on 
these subjects.
Modern thought may be characterized as an 
exercise in critical thinking—often a stated outcome 
of the successful completion of university-level 
coursework. Of course, critique craves criteria. In 
this regard, methodology is to modernism what the 
belief in reason and the scientific method was to 
the Enlightenment. Methodology was the bedrock 
of modernism. Beyond the sciences, methodology 
manifested itself in everything from the creation 
of operational definitions in the social sciences to 
the science and craft of textual analysis in the arts. 
Works could be regarded as artifacts and subjected 
to the same forensic analysis one might apply to a 
shard of pottery from an archeological dig.
Modernism, in the simplest terms, may then 
be characterized as a process of textual analysis. 
Artifacts can be texts and texts can be artifacts; 
the symmetry is elegant and direct. Books and 
bones, symphonies and sonnets, paintings and 
photographs, dances and dramatic performances, 
architecture and anatomy, legal procedure and 
religious liturgy may all be regarded as texts. Each 
text is a nut; crack it to get to the meat. Break 
atoms to get to the energy of the universe. The 
story of every text as artifact or artifact as text—the 
narrative that propels us through the arc of every 
account—is there to be told. 
Currently, our knowledge of the external world 
is gained by regarding its elements as artifacts to 
be examined and as texts to be analyzed. Once 
we can establish/ determine/ or lay claim to 
an understanding of the narrative of a text, its 
secrets may be revealed and deeper meanings 
can be plumbed and satisfactory explanations of 
the phenomenon can be presented. The wonder 
of textual analysis was and is that everything ever 
needed was already there to be discovered in the 
entity itself. Patterns and motifs, metaphors and 
tropes—the full array of indicators—are open to 
interpretation. Science uses its methods to unravel 
DNA from RNA and reveal the patterns that 
determine future generations. Literary criticism 
dissects a different set of specimens. Both claim to 
have prized the meaning, or at least one plausible 
meaning, from the object itself. Individuals, co-
authors, or research teams present evidence based 
on rigorous analysis, based on accepted standards 
within their particular disciplines, and based on the 
expertise they have painstakingly earned to qualify 
as legitimate practitioners.
　The addition of postmodernism
Postmodernism expands modernism. All the 
modern tools are used. A new and wider way 
of understanding moder n conditions is also 
introduced. That is the post in postmodernism; 
postmodernism is the next step, not the elimination 
of the staircase. Careful textual analysis and 
examination of ar tifacts continues to provide 
evidence for the verification of information. Facts 
are established in light of earlier knowledge gained 
and challenged and refined within standards that 
are always being elevated. Confirmation provides 
a provisionally workable proposition; the proof 
is used insofar as it is useful, and proofs are 
upgraded as better solutions are crafted. Accredited 
gatekeepers, from researchers to editors along the 
line of peer reviewers and qualified commentators, 
critique each claim and lively debate advances the 
discussion. 
What next step, then, takes us to the realm of 
postmodernism? The postmodern step is from text 
to context. The question, “What is going on in this 
text/ work/ artifact?” expands to the consideration 
of the circumstances in which the text/ work/ 
artifact was created—its context. 
While this paper is presented as an example of 
creative non-fiction academic writing, we also offer 
discussion of how a wider sense of creative writing 
may connect with the context of postmodernism. 
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Rather than to opine in the abstract, it will be useful 
to consider a selection of postmodern luminaries 
across a variety of perspectives. These include 
feminism and post-colonialism; the turn to literature 
for direction in the role of postmodern thinking 
toward resolving present-day challenges; whether 
to care about context and relegate authorship 
to an “author function” rather than a particular 
personality; and to reflect on the place of the 
individual in reconstructing the ethical universe 
after postmodernism.
　　Part 2:　 A Sampling of the Varieties of 
Postmodern Contextualization 
　2.1　Feminism and Post-colonialism
In critical response to Norma Alarcon’s “The 
Theoretical Subject(s) of This Bridge Called My 
Back and Anglo-American Feminism” and Kwame 
Anthony Appiah’s “The Postcolonial and the 
Postmodern”, the theme we explore is in how we 
may see the world from the perspective of others. 
How does one get beyond a position—feminism, 
post-colonialism, or postmodernism—that seems 
so easily to fall into being characterized as simply 
amounting to an oppositional situation?
How does one get beyond a narrow concept of 
feminism as a concern of white, Western, educated, 
affluent women and take a wider and non-binary 
perspective? This is the question in Alarcon’s 
ar ticle. For Appiah, the linkage between post-
colonialism and postmodernism explores how the 
linguistic and literary turn may offer insights into a 
wider view of postmodenism and postmodernity.
As a vehicle for analysis, though more narrowly 
for Alarcon, each scholar uses a particular cultural 
artifact as an entry point into discussion. Alarcon 
assesses the challenges and impact of “a collection 
of essays, poems, tales and testimonials that 
would give voice to the contradictory experiences 
of ‘women of color’” (Alarcon 140), entitled This 
Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women 
of Color. Appiah feels, “Yoruba Man with a Bicycle … 
provides us with an image of an object that can 
ser ve as a point of entr y to my theme: a piece 
of contemporary African art that will allow us to 
explore the articulation of the postcolonial and the 
postmodern” (Appiah 139).
　2.1.1　Alarcon and Post-feminist Feminism
In “The Theoretical Subject(s) of This Bridge 
Called My Back and Anglo-American Feminism”, 
Alarcon lays out the problem that in a work 
specifically designed to move beyond where “writers 
were aware of the displacement of their subjectivity 
across a multiplicity of discourses: feminist/lesbian, 
nationalist, racial, socioeconomic, historical, etc. … 
[and which] implies a multiplicity of positions 
from which they are driven to grasp or understand 
themselves and their relations with the real, in the 
Althusserian sense of the word …  Bridge writers, 
in part, were aware that these positions are often 
incompatible or contradictory, and others did not 
have access to the maze of discourses competing 
for their body and voice” (140).
Alarcon explicates a number of the features of 
this maze, beginning with the question of who is 
regarded as the subject of feminism. We find “The 
modal ‘person’ in feminist theory still appears to 
be a self suf ficient individual adult … [who] … 
corresponds to the female subject most admired 
in literature which Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
had characterized as one who ‘articulates herself 
in shifting relationship to . . . the constitution and 
‘interpellation’ of the subject not only as individual 
but as ‘individualist’ [and that] Consequently, the 
‘native female’ or ‘woman of color’ can be excluded 
from the discourse of feminist theory” (141). 
The “‘masculine cast’ of radical feminist language, 
for example, noting the terms of ‘raw power, brute 
force, mar tial discipline, law and order with a 
feminist face - and voice’” (142) is also discussed, as 
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are its theoretical consequences. These are laid out 
in the following extract. Alarcon says, 
this gendered standpoint epistemology leads 
to feminism’s bizarre position with regard 
to other liberation movements, working 
inherently against the interests of non-
white women and no one else. For example, 
Sandra Harding argues that oppositional 
thinking (counteridentification) with white 
men should be retained even though “[t]
here are suggestions in the literature of 
Native Americans, Africans, and Asians 
that what feminists call feminine versus 
masculine personalities, ontologies, ethics, 
epistemologies, and world views may be what 
these other liberation movements call Non-
Western versus Western personalities and 
world views. (143)
Alarcon notes a number of problems, ranging 
from the “exclusionar y practices in Women’s 
Studies”(145) to the fact that modernist-based 
assumptions are decidedly Western. 
Standpoint epistemologists have made use 
of the now gendered and feminist notion of 
consciousness, without too much question. 
(This notion, of course, represents the 
highest value of European culture since 
the Enlightenment.) The inclusion of other 
analytical categories such as race and class 
becomes impossible for a subject whose 
consciousness refuses to acknowledge that ‘one 
becomes a woman’ in ways that are much more 
complex than in a simple opposition to men. In 
cultures in which ‘asymmetric race and class 
relations are a central organizing principle of 
society,’ one may also ‘become a woman’ in 
opposition to other women. In other words, the 
whole category of woman may also need to be 
problematized. (145) 
The chal lenge of  meaningful ly  engaging 
difference is also a paradoxical pursuit. “There is 
a tendency in more sophisticated and elaborate 
gender standpoint epistemologists to af firm 
‘an identity made up of heterogeneous and 
heteronomous representations of gender, race, 
and class, and often indeed across languages and 
cultures’ with one breath, and with the next to 
refuse to explore how that identity may be theorized 
or analyzed, by reconfirming a unified subjectivity 
or ‘shared consciousness’ through gender. The 
difference is handed over with one hand and taken 
away with the other” (150).
Alarcon comments that, “The choice of one or 
many themes is both theoretical and a political 
decision. Like gender epistemologists and other 
emancipatory movements, the theoretical subject of 
Bridge gives credit to the subject of consciousness 
as the site of knowledge but problematizes it by 
representing it as a weave” (152). Alarcon ends 
saying, “current political practices in the United 
States make it almost impossible to go beyond an 
oppositional theory of the subject, which is the 
prevailing feminist strategy and that of others; 
however, it is not the theory that will help us grasp 
the subjectivity of women of color” (152). 
These two extracts set up interesting possibilities 
to consider. Having explored the dif ficulties and 
dead ends in theoretical approaches to feminism in 
the years following Bridge, two approaches seem 
implied. One is that the political aspect must be 
given more energy. A second is that oppositional 
theory must be both altered and augmented to 
include female as a feature that interacts with 
immigration status, race, ethnicity, income, 
language, culture, LGBT orientation, physical 
condition, psychological status and an ongoing 
series of ‘woven discourses’ that respond to the 
richly complex conditions of gender in an emerging 
postmodernist and post-feminist context. 
We now tur n from Norma Alarcon’s “The 
Theoretical Subject(s) of This Bridge Called My 
Back and Anglo-American Feminism” to focus on 
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Kwame Anthony Appiah’s views on post-colonialism 
and postmodernism.
　2.1.2　Appiah and Art as Engagement 
While Norma Alarcon’s article considered how 
a “gendered standpoint epistemology leads to 
feminism’s bizarre position with regard to other 
liberation movements … [that] … may be what 
these other liberation movements call Non-Western 
versus Western personalities and world views” 
(Alarcon, 143), Appiah explores the linkage between 
postcolonialism and postmodernism in terms of 
how artistic, linguistic and literary turns may offer 
insights into a wider view of postmodenism and 
postmodernity.
We feel that Appiah has effectively accomplished 
two goals. First, he has applied the sort of critique 
that Alarcon makes of feminism to postmodernism’s 
ability to provide supportive insights into Non-
Western liberation movements. Second, he has 
provided tangible (paradoxically, by examining 
cultural artifacts such as art and literature) criteria 
for analysis that go beyond ‘theoretically totalizing’ 
projects he and Alarcon critique.
On the subject of postmodernism as a term 
fraught with as much contention as that of feminism 
(in our comparison, not in Appiah’s words), which 
Appiah describes as “shark-infested waters around 
the semantic island of the postmodern” (140), he 
contends that, “postmodernism is equally offensive 
in all the respects enumerated (think of punk rock 
or pornography), it is no longer at all ‘oppositional’ 
in that sense; indeed, it constitutes the ver y 
dominant or hegemonic aesthetic of consumer 
society itself and significantly serves the latter’s 
commodity production as a vir tual laborator y 
of new forms and fashions. The argument for a 
conception of postmodernism as a periodizing 
categor y is thus based on the presupposition 
that, even if all the formal features enumerated 
above were already present in the older high 
modernism, the very significance of those features 
changes when they become a cultural dominant 
with a precise socio-economic functionality” (142). 
Appiah says that this view does “leave open, 
then, the relations between postmodernism and 
postmodernity. Where the practice is theor y—
literar y or philosophical—postmodernism as a 
theory of postmodernity can be adequate only if it 
reflects to some extent the realities of that practice, 
because the practice is itself fully theoretical. But 
when a postmodernism addresses, say, advertising 
or poetry, it may be adequate as an account of them 
even if it conflicts with their own narratives, their 
theories of themselves. For, unlike philosophy 
and literary theory, advertising and poetry are not 
largely constituted by their articulated theories of 
themselves” (142).
We f ind the centra l  moment  of  Appiah’s 
argument comes for ward most clearly in the 
following extracts. He says, “I want to argue that 
to understand our—our human—modernity we 
must first understand why the rationalization of 
the world can no longer be seen as the tendency 
either of the West or of history; why, simply put, the 
modernist characterization of (144) modernity must 
be challenged. To understand our world is to reject 
Weber’s claim for the rationality of what he called 
rationalization and his projection of its inevitability; 
it is, then, to have a radically post-Weberian 
conception of modernity” (145) and “Modernity has 
turned every element of the real into a sign, and 
the sign reads ‘for sale’; this is true even in domains 
like religion where instrumental reason would 
recognize that the market has at best an ambiguous 
place” (145).
In terms of providing a concrete basis for 
assessment of the postmodern and post-colonialism 
through considerations of cultural artifacts such 
as art and literature, Appiah’s excoriates, “What 
is postmodernist is Vogel’s muddled conviction 
that African art should not be judged ‘in terms 
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of [someone else’s] traditional criteria.’ For 
modernism, primitive ar t was to be judged by 
putatively universal aesthetic criteria, and by these 
standards it was finally found possible to value it. 
The sculptors and painters who found it possible 
were largely seeking an Archimedean point outside 
their own cultures for a critique of a Weberian 
modernity. For postmoderns, by contrast, these 
works, however they are to be understood, cannot 
be seen as legitimated by culture and histor y-
transcending standards” (148). In a key passage 
fur ther on in this argument,  Appiah asser ts, 
All aspects of contemporary African cultural 
life—including music and some sculpture 
and painting, even some writings with which 
the West is largely not familiar—have been 
influenced, often powerfully, by the transition of 
African societies through colonialism, but they 
are not all in the relevant sense postcolonial. 
For the post in postcolonial, like the post in 
postmodern is the post of the space clearing 
gesture I characterized earlier: and many areas 
of contemporary African cultural life—what 
has come to be theorized as popular culture, in 
particular—are not in this way concerned with 
transcending, with going beyond, coloniality. 
Indeed, it might be said to be a mark of popular 
culture that its borrowings from international 
cultural forms are remarkably insensitive 
to—not so much dismissive of as blind to—
the issue of neocolonialism or ‘cultural 
imperialism.’ This does not mean that theories 
of postmodernism are irrelevant to these forms 
of culture: for the internationalization of the 
market and the commodification of artworks 
are both central to them. But it does mean that 
these artworks are not understood by their 
producers or their consumers in terms of a 
postmodern ism [italics added for emphasis]: 
there is no antecedent practice whose claim to 
exclusivity of vision is rejected through these 
artworks. What is called ‘syncretism’ here is 
made possible by the international exchange 
of commodities, but is not a consequence of a 
space-clearing gesture. (149)
Finally, while Appiah concedes “the international 
commodification of African expressive culture … 
[is] a commodification that requires, by the logic 
of the space-clearing gesture, the manufacture 
of Other ness” (156), he also contends “the 
contemporary African art piece called “The Man 
with a Bicycle is produced by someone who does not 
care that the bicycle is the white man’s invention— 
it is not there to be Other to the Yoruba Self; it is 
there because someone cared for its solidity; it is 
there because it will take us further than our feet 
will take us; it is there because machines are now as 
African as novelists” (157). 
This is a demonstration of the concrete basis for 
his earlier-stated dictum that “postmodernism as a 
theory of postmodernity can be adequate only if it 
reflects to some extent the realities of that practice” 
(142). 
In an assessment of literature, one with a 
conclusion far less cheer ful than the insights 
offered about The Man with a Bicycle art object, 
Appiah points to literature as the most useful entry 
into the reality of practice through the humanism 
it communicates and the social justice it demands. 
He explains, “For what I am calling humanism 
can be provisional,  historically contingent, 
antiessentialist (in other words, postmodern), 
and still be demanding. We can surely maintain a 
powerful engagement with the concern to avoid 
cruelty and pain while nevertheless recognizing 
the contingency of that concern. Maybe, then, we 
can recover within postmodernism the postcolonial 
writers’ humanism—the concer n for human 
suffering, for the victims of the postcolonial state … 
—while still rejecting the master narratives of 
modernism” (155). 
Here we find, along with powerful critiques of 
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notions of the postmodern, what may be termed a 
“turn to literature” as offering the most promising 
method of gaining insights leading to practical 
strategies applicable to feminism as well as Non-
Western liberation movements.          
　2.2　 The turn to literature for direction in the 
role of  postmodern thinking toward 
resolving present-day challenges: Parker 
and Preston 
In critical response to David Parker and Larry 
Preston’s work on the vital nature of the literary 
imagination in framing the postmodern condition, 
we continue our theme that the turn to literature 
provides the most promising direction in the role of 
postmodern thinking toward resolving present-day 
challenges.
In the writings of Parker and Preston there is 
a tension between wanting some essential, some 
irreducible spirit of human goodness versus the 
postmodern rejection of totalizing and idealized 
Enlightenment notions of a grand narrative of 
metanarrative that too-often becomes equivalent 
(if it was not already so at its inception) with white, 
male, European, educated, moneyed and privileged 
Wester n str uctural institutional hegemonic 
oppression. We begin with Parker.
　2.2.1　Parker
In Chapter 2, “A new turn toward the ethical”, in a 
section of his work called “The ethical unconscious”, 
David Parker reflects on a number of contemporary 
philosophers who link literature with ethics. Parker 
feels it’s significant these individuals—such as 
Martha Nussbaum, Richard Eldridge, and Richard 
Rorty—are theorists rather than literary critics 
(33). It may be argued that the consequence of 
this shift amounts to a turning away from literary 
figures to establish, discuss and validate the ways 
literature engages with ethical issues to create a 
form of academic specialization that isolates its 
impact to the academy and distances it from more 
pedestrian popular culture. Parker simply observes 
that turning toward theorists means “the ‘turn 
toward the ethical’ within literary studies is closely 
connected to a turn toward the literar y within 
ethics” (33). It’s notable that Parker conflates ethics 
with the formal theorizing of scholars rather than 
the social practices of individuals. Yes, it would be 
more cumbersome to say ways academics study 
how humans conduct themselves in interacting with 
the world instead of ethics. It would also be more 
accurate, but having stated that refinement, let’s 
move on.
Considering that “literature and the arts help 
ethics” the way that “mathematics helps physics 
do its job” (33) does set up another typically 
postmodern conundrum. A positive outcome of the 
rejection of positivism is that ethics stops being 
“a second-class discourse which dealt only with 
the ‘subjective’ or ‘ephemeral’ side of experience, 
as opposed to science, which alone addressed 
‘objective’ reality” (33). The dif ficulty arises in 
finding a method for avoiding the sort of “ethical 
skepticism leading from Hume … in which ethics is 
at the very best a second-class discourse” (34).
We find the central moment, the “charm point” 
of the turn to literature summarized in Parker’s 
précis of Nussbaum, is in emphasizing  “either 
the mutually antagonistic nature of impor tant 
values, or the ethical importance of contingency 
or the passions, or the priority of particulars over 
generalities–all of which tend to resist systematic 
theoretical statement of the kind attempted in the 
available styles of conventional philosophy” (35). 
Parker poses the following question. Is it 
“impossible to remain purely on the level of the 
linguistic or the semiotic … [and are such claims] … 
simply self-delusive” (39)? He answers this question 
in the affirmative to require his readers to grant the 
inescapability of the sphere of ethics (39) to present 
his idea that any attempts to escape (he uses the 
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word suppress) the presence of ethics signals the 
existence of an “ethical unconscious” (40).
What we see is the tension we alluded to at the 
start of this section—the wish for an irreducible 
spirit of human goodness versus the postmodern 
rejection of totalizing and idealized Enlightenment 
notions of a grand narrative. Parker flags as 
his crucial point that “the erosion of the canon 
[presumably in the form of the existence of an 
“ethical unconscious” safeguarding the irreducible 
spirit of human goodness] … has serious ethical 
consequences” (40) and this really doesn’t 
seem like much of a point. Rather, it seems like 
he is foregoing his conclusion. What are those 
consequences? And, if an “ethical unconscious” is 
always at work, doesn’t this preserve the canon?
Finally, it seems Parker has done such a good 
job of linking the roles of ethical theor y with 
imaginative literature that his conclusion is 
unsurprising. He notes that literary theory already 
acknowledges this relationship and that because 
“other theorists [and here he is referring to ethical 
theorists] have not been quite so sensible… a 
defence of the continuing importance of the literary 
canon as theory’s necessary Other is continually 
being called for” (42).
Now, let’s turn to an article by Larry Preston, 
which takes up the same challenges and may 
provide a more satisfing discussion of meeting 
them.
　2.2.2　Preston
The abstract to Larr y Preston’s “Theorizing 
Difference: Voices from the Margins,” states his 
main premise. “Theory more attentive to difference 
needs to gain access to the meanings that circulate 
within dif ferent lives, especially as reflected in 
literary writing of those who, themselves, speak and 
write from sites of difference” (941).
Preston says that “The problematics of difference 
within the arena of political theory are related to 
issues of passing and passages in a number of ways” 
(942) and takes issue with the situation in which 
“theorists seem to view their language as a (the?) 
neutral passageway through which all identities and 
differences can be seen and interpreted” (942).
 In a section titled “passing for”, about the 
language of theor y, Preston obser ves that the 
postmodern “view that language is central to how 
we understand ourselves and others is now rather 
unproblematic (Derrida 1982; KoJodny 1985; 
Miller 1988; Rorty 1989; Showalter 1982, 1985; 
Wittgenstein 1953; and countless others)”[, that] 
“‘empirical’ patterns emerge because they reflect 
the ways in which linguistic meanings and practices 
have played out within the context of social life”[, 
which lead to the conclusion that] “it is no longer 
sensible to view dif ferent sociological ‘ways of 
life’  as anything more than the distinct meanings 
and practices—the language games—associated 
with dif ferent linguistic ‘forms of life’” (943). 
This situation is important to Preston’s argument 
because he feels that the rules of this language 
game must be expanded. Moreover, Preston’s 
contention—which we agree with and which echoes 
Parker’s position above—is that this dynamic has 
always been in play and that it must be consciously 
cultivated rather than pompously attacked.
While Parker sees “literary canon as theory’s 
necessary Other” (Parker, 42) and Preston would 
certainly agree, Preston is more specific about how 
language forms passageways for other voices to be 
heard. In terms of theory’s challenge in ever seeing 
itself clearly, the following concerns are pertinent. 
“Isn’t the language-of-theory falsely passing as a 
language that can speak for everyone? Is it not 
only the echoed voice of those who have been 
constructed by—who speak and write from—the 
practices and routines of the language-of-theory?” 
(Preston, 945). Assuming an affirmative answer to 
those questions, the distillate from this conclusion 
is that one must pass beyond theoretical language 
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because “attention to literature and literary forms 
undoubtedly extends the reach of careful analysis 
and theoretical argument” (947) while also bearing 
in mind the caveat that “major literature is typically 
written from the meanings offered by the dominant 
discourse” (948).
While never using the term ‘minor literature’ 
in juxtaposition to major literature, the best 
available option in attempting to hear the voices 
from the margins is to appreciate that “creative 
reterritorialization of language by minority writers 
matters for purposes of political theor y” (949) 
and to abjure the damning-with-faint-praise that 
characterizes celebrating the peculiar uniqueness of 
distinct narratives. In fact, “minority voices suggest 
that if cherished parts of their particular stories are 
made secure, no one need waste analytical prose 
shoring up the individuality of their choices” (950). 
Although posed as a question, Preston really makes 
more of a statement when he says, “Why not leave 
disparate, reflective/literar y accounts in place, 
clearly associated with the form of life that has 
called them up—doubting any effort to prioritize 
them or to analyze just which one is more basic or 
consistent or true by some general view” (950). 
As we ponder where this might leave us—
cer tainly in a condition of uncer tainty, which 
Preston advocates as a necessary humility—it is 
also relevant to explore what this uncertainty might 
open us to. 
On the topic of how some feminist writing has 
valued the literary turn, Preston notes that, “In an 
effort to pass beyond the male-centered character of 
dominant theory, French feminists Monique Wittig 
(1969, 1980), Helene Cixous (1976, 1991), and Luce 
Irigaray (1985a, 1985b, 1993) move back and forth 
between writing literature (essays, novels) and 
theory” (946). 
We close with three additional extracts from 
Preston, which reference creative fiction non-
academic writing as well as creative non-fiction 
academic writing.
Under the title, “Literary Life and Language: 
Passing Beyond the Language of Theory”, Preston 
observes,
If not routine, the use of literature and literary 
forms of writing are not absent from social and 
political theory. Allegories and metaphors, as 
well as writing that is richly literary, are central 
to Plato’s Republic and figure prominently in 
the writing of such disparate philosophers 
as Niccolo Machiavelli (1957, 1988), Jean 
Jacques Rousseau (1931, 1964, 1979), Friedrich 
Nietzsche (esp. 1966, 1967, 1968, 1974), 
Michael Walzer (1988), and Richard Rorty 
(1989). Such attention to literature and literary 
forms undoubtedly extends the reach of careful 
analysis and theoretical argument. (947)
Preston rather humorously speaks in “reaffirmation 
of Foucault’s view that intellectuals who have a 
penchant for firmly gluing together general claims 
or prescriptions from carefully selected scraps of 
aristocratic presumption and intuition are to be 
regarded with great caution (1972,126-33) ” (951).
Finally, Preston opines on the necessity of the 
creative element—creative writing or otherwise—in 
the postmodern world. He writes,
Does this mean that those who would refashion 
theories may face the prospect of also learning 
to write as novelists and poets, essayists and 
playwrights? I suspect so, at least some of the 
time. If we are to proceed from metapolitical 
theory to political theories-without-a-gaze, it is 
hard to see how passing beyond the voice of 
secure and confident, detached analysis can 
be avoided. It is also difficult to imagine that 
those who pass their days entirely within the 
form of life of privileged academic theorists 
can acquire much facility in using anything but 
theoretical language. Yet those who have little 
or no facility to reach imaginatively into and to 
write about the differences within particular 
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people’s lives are probably not to be trusted 
when they would fashion the principles and 
politics that affect those lives. Their analytical 
reach exceeds their imaginative grasp. (951)
While we feel the rocks roll in a concer ted 
fashion, we may also envision the image of a dance 
palace as we consider the various moves and 
gestures—each with its own meaning and intent—
involved in communicating the ideas and actions 
needed to create a better world to remove obstacles 
that stop groups and individuals from creating a 
better world for themselves. We may see Larry 
Preston orchestrating a rumba demonstrating his 
contention that “literary and analytical languages 
need to learn how to dance together, leading and 
following and moving together in turn as suggested 
by the tempo of different rhythms” (Preston, 943). 
We end this section with brief discussion of two 
luminaries, Martha Nussbaum and Richard Rorty, 
weighing in on the turn to literature for direction in 
the role of postmodern thinking toward resolving 
present-day challenges.
　2.3　Martha Nussbaum and Richard Rorty
The idea of personal stories drawing in voices 
from the fringe, that echoes Larr y Preston’s 
(1995) comments on voices from the margins, also 
bears on Martha Nussbaum and Richard Rorty’s 
assertions on the work personal stories in literary 
works do in understanding other communities and 
in creating more humane social contexts.
Nussbaum (1995) chooses novels, in particular, 
as important creative works in terms of “literary 
imagination and public life” because they invoke 
story arcs that confer the “ability to imagine what it 
is like to live the life of another person who might, 
given changes in circumstances, be oneself or one 
of one’s loved ones” (Nussbaum (1995), 5).
This is a sentiment Rorty(1998) also expresses. 
He refers to this action as “sentimentality” and 
describes how it operates through sharing of stories 
that touch our similarities. He suggests the sorts 
of long sad stories that put us in another person’s 
position are the ways to invoke a more useful sense 
of culture. Rorty’s relevant question isn’t “ ‘Why 
should I be moral?’ but rather … ‘Why should I care 
about a stranger, a person who is no kin to me, a 
person whose habits I find disgusting?’ [and advises 
that a] … better sort of answer is the sort of long, 
sad, sentimental story that begins, ‘Because this is 
what it is like to be in her situation” (Rorty 1989), 
“Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality”, 
185). In terms of the socially transformative 
potential of Rorty’s invocation to experience the 
lived reality of the other, his obser vations on 
changing the vocabulary/ the narrative itself by 
understanding, reinvention and refusing to “play 
by the rules of somebody else’s final vocabulary” 
(Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 133) are part of 
the action plan.
Nussbaum (1995) and Rorty (1989) are clearly 
on the same page, with an “interest in the ordinary” 
(Nussbaum (1995), 9) and in Ror ty’s (1989) 
comment above (“Human Rights, Rationality, and 
Sentimentality”, 185) even though they pen different 
marginal notations on that page. Nussbaum 
(1995) argues for the novel as the best way to “get 
potentially universalizable concrete prescriptions 
by bringing a general idea of human flourishing 
to bear on a concrete situation, which we are 
invited to enter through the imagination” (8). Rorty 
(1989) would abjure the universalizable concrete 
prescriptions part of Nussbaum’s (1995) sentiment 
while expanding the texts from novels to a wider 
range of literature, including oral traditions and 
spoken word testimonies. While Nussbaum advises 
that literar y “insights should not displace the 
workings of economic science” (12), Rorty (1989) 
would challenge economic science to present the 
sort of insights into the human condition a literary 
imagination provides.
Both Nussbaum and Ror ty comment of the 
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function of literature in providing the narratives 
that allow context to play such a pivotal role in the 
postmodern world. This formulation, of context 
as the defining necessity in truly understanding 
the texts—the operating manuals—of current 
scholarship and the narratives of our postmodern 
world, leads to another question. Since context is 
the primary function, how important is the author? 
Might the author simply be noted as having 
performed an “author function” as a way to allow 
the reader/ audience to more directly engage with 
the narrative? Michel Foucault addresses this issue 
in our next section.
　2.4　 Whether to care primarily about context 
and relegate authorship to an “author 
func t ion” ra the r  than  a  pa r t i cu la r 
personality: Foucault and the use of the 
author function as a deus ex machina
In crit ical  response to Michel Foucault ’s 
multilayered discourse in “What is an author?” 
and the relation this bears to the significance of 
individual agency in the postmodern world, we 
contend there is merit in exploring associations 
correlated with the word author. In presenting 
another way of looking at Foucault’s concept of the 
author function, introducing notions of authority, 
authenticity, and authorization leads to a sense of 
what a postmodern ethic must seek.
Foucault ends “What is an author?” by posing the 
rhetorical question of what difference it makes who 
is speaking. He begins by reflecting on the time 
before the concept of author attained privileged 
status as an individual mark of honor and quoting 
Beckett’s absurdist (and what Simon Critchley, 
below, would term passive nihilist) query “‘What 
does it matter who is speaking,’ someone said, 
‘what does it matter who is speaking’” (Foucault 
Reader, 101) as a portrayal of the indifference of 
contemporary postmodern writing.
The project “What is an author?” engages in is 
one in which the turn to the self as represented by 
individual authors is repudiated and the “absence” 
of the author is employed to suggest a useful 
construct in the form of the “author function”. 
This is, “a matter of depriving the subject (or its 
substitute) of its role as originator, and of analyzing 
the subject as a variable and complex function of 
discourse” (FR, 118). 
We may now use the author function to explore 
a number of problematic terms that comprise the 
vocabulary of postmodernism as want (of some 
basis for the author function) and repudiation (of 
the notion of author as subject originator). Author 
as the author function is invested with three 
operational features: authority, authenticity, and 
authorization.
By authority, we may refer to concepts such as 
the legitimate use of power, control and rights. 
The question arises, “By what right may we say 
someone is an author?” Foucault poses the question 
as, “If an individual were not an author, could we say 
that what he wrote, said, left behind in his papers, 
or what has been collected of his remarks, could 
be called a ‘work’? [and notes that] Even when an 
individual has been accepted as an author, we must 
still ask whether everything that he wrote, said, or 
left behind is part of his work” (FR, 103). 
On the question of authenticity, there is the 
nuance that we seek a truth that can be genuinely 
validated. The following quer y speaks to this 
functionality. “If I discover that Shakespeare was 
not born in the house that we visit today, this is 
a modification which, obviously, will not alter the 
functioning of the author’s name. But if we proved 
that Shakespeare did not write those sonnets which 
pass for his, that would constitute a significant 
change and affect the manner in which the author’s 
name functions” (FR ,  106). Here we have a 
functional (we may say a performative) designation 
of the author’s name in which a demand for 
authenticity wishes to be met.
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This leads to a third association, authorization, 
correlated with the word author as embodied 
in the author function, which is nuanced with 
notions of the need for agreement, permission, 
consent or some species of consensus—as a way 
of representing what is actually taking place. “The 
author function is therefore characteristic of the 
mode of existence, circulation, and functioning 
of certain discourses within a society” (FR, 108) 
[and] “The author is the principle of thrift in the 
proliferation of meaning (FR, 118) [because] these 
aspects of an individual which we designate as 
making him an author are only a projection, in more 
or less psychologizing terms, of the operations that 
we force texts to undergo, the connections that we 
make, the traits that we establish as pertinent, the 
continuities that we recognize, [and, moreover, 
these] operations var y according to periods 
and types of discourse. We do not construct a 
‘philosophical author’ as we do a ‘poet’” (FR, 110).
In conclusion, the heart of the author function 
seems to be in its use as a substitute/ doppelganger 
for, as a deus ex machina of, the very essences 
postmodernism contests. Concepts nuanced in 
the word author—authority, authenticity, and 
authorization—may be invoked via the author 
function. 
As an addendum to this conclusion, and as 
an illuminating excursion, we herein share our 
response to queries posed by a colleague who 
read the above section. The following questions 
were posed: “Given Foucault’s position regarding 
authorship, how would you place him as an 
intellectual and why? In other words, what kind of 
‘author’ is he? Is he the initiator of another kind of 
discursivity? If so what kind? What kind of functions 
do his work play in the current times?” 
We offer the following reply.
In terms of Foucault’s position regarding 
authorship, we think he does conform to the earlier 
classical standards of St. Jerome that he delineates. 
His works are appreciated as of a similar quality 
and standard, he asserts his voice consistently as 
the author of the works, we see the contradictions 
in his work explained through references to 
his maturation as a thinker and explicable as 
experimentation with different ways of formulating 
his thoughts, and there are no peculiar gaf fs 
whereby he references something that happened 
after his death.
As for Foucault as the initiator of another kind of 
discursivity, we sense that’s his desire and also feel 
he provides himself, in the following extract, with 
an “out” if posterity fails to elevate him to the status 
of a Freud or Marx. Foucault explains, “What I have 
just outlined regarding the initiation of discursive 
practices is, of course, very schematic; this is true, 
in particular, of the opposition that I have tried to 
draw between discursive initiation and scientific 
founding. It is not always easy to distinguish 
between the two; moreover, nothing proves that 
they are two mutually exclusive procedures. I have 
attempted the distinction for only one reason: to 
show that the author function, which is complex 
enough when one tries to situate it at the level 
of a book or a series of texts that carry a given 
signature, involves still more determining factors 
when one tries to analyze it in larger units, such as 
groups of works or entire disciplines” (FR, 117).
In current times we find Foucault’s works 
function to consolidate a broad flow of thought 
streams. His breadth as a thinker—philosopher, 
literary critic, historian, linguist, social theorist, 
activist—and the density of his prose are attractive 
and repulsive. By that we mean he’ll always be able 
to provide insights into a range of social justice 
issues, from prison reform to sur veillance to 
Lacanian nuanced discussions of master signifiers 
and Freudian archetypes, and there will always 
be an initial tendency to balk at the degree of 




―社会情報系― 社会情報学研究  27  2018
While Foucault, above, has focused on social 
discourse that necessarily must go beyond 
individual personalities and challenge notions 
that authorial intent is the final arbiter of the 
meaning of a work, discussion of the role of the 
individual is useful in providing counterpoints. We 
now turn our focus to reflect on the place of the 
individual in reconstructing the ethical universe 
after postmodernism. We begin with two modern 
thinkers, William James and John Dewey.
　2.5　 Reflections on the place of individual 
morality in reconstructing the ethical 
universe after postmodernism.
　2.5.1　 William James and John Dewey: The 
Imperative of Individuality and the 
Esthetics of Ethics
In critical response to the challenge we feel both 
James and Dewey engage in, of reconstructing the 
ethical universe after postmodernism, we begin 
with some points of commonality between them. 
The first is that ethics on any level must be the 
result of feeling from an experiential perspective.
We respond to what we feel. So, do we feel 
intellectually or can feeling only be an emotional 
response? This begets a second question. How are 
we to distinguish between feeling intellectually 
and feeling emotionally? Here it’s impor tant 
to recognize a binar y that suggests intellect is 
superior to emotion. The point, however, is not that 
intellect is better than emotion. Rather, intellect 
follows emotion. We end up feeling intellectually 
if there is enough merit in our emotional feelings. 
The mistake is in imagining that these intellectual 
constructs are independent from the emotions that 
produced them.
The journey is from attempting to describe what 
is, to discussing how we feel about it, to questioning 
why we feel that way. This is a movement from the 
discursive to the rhetorical. As one moves from 
description to engagement (as how one feels about 
it), there is also a need to justify why one feels 
that way and to encourage/ persuade others to 
feel the same way. Simply put, we may say this is 
a movement from “what” to “how” to “why.” The 
“how” concerns how we feel and the wish to explain 
and justify how we could feel. The “why” continues 
our explanation with self-analysis that allows us to 
feel comfortable in our beliefs—in short, to feel our 
moral attitude connects with ethical behavior even 
in the absence of any absolute and universal and 
totalizing ethical standards—and to try to persuade 
others as to why they should feel the same way. 
Here we have the rhetorical element as a feature 
we are aware of and that we don’t seek to suppress. 
Indeed, the advocacy of one’s felt needs and 
beliefs is a mark of “critical thinking” that speaks 
to both the awareness of our own biases and the 
presentation of the strongest possible arguments in 
favor of our opinions in light of this understanding. 
These observations are made in light of William 
James’ discussion of conflicting demands and the 
fundamental basis of ethics lying in the contesting 
of demands that, in the real world, must necessarily 
involve inconsistencies.
Akin to this concept of emotional feeling leading 
to intellectual feeling, Dewey comments on the 
origins of sweet versus bitter and how that “was 
not to denote qualities of sense as such but to 
discriminate things as favorable and hostile” (15) 
as an emotional reaction to the environment rather 
than a scientific assessment of sense data.
Dewey talks about how artificial it is to separate 
the art from the experience of seeing the art. That 
is, we see art in a gallery and this is a community 
whether other individuals are there discussing 
the art with us or if we happen to be there and few 
others wander through the particular salon we’re in 
(1). This is even more true about classic works of art.
When Dewey comments “Most European 
museums are, among other things, memorials of 
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the rise of nationalism and imperialism” (7), the 
point is that there must be care and concern about 
the use to which the art was, is, or will be put. This 
sentiment is echoed much later in the following 
extract. “Were ar t an acknowledged power in 
human association … and were morals understood 
to be identical with every aspect of value that is 
shared in experience, the ‘problem’ of the relation 
of art and morals would not exist” (362).
Dewey’s real project is in “recovering the 
continuity of esthetic experience with normal 
processes of living” (9). In discussing what it really 
means to be able to appreciate (as in, to gather 
in and accumulate/ appropriate in an appropriate 
rather than a predatory manner) the perspectives of 
others—through artistic emulation or otherwise—
Dewey calls for going beyond mere imitation and 
decoration and to internalize, to “enter into the 
structure [to] bring about an organic blending of 
attitudes characteristic of the experience of our own 
age and that of remote peoples” (347) [to produce, 
as an enduring effect,] “an expansion of their [italics 
used by Dewey to connote individuals able to 
appreciate this process] sympathetic imagination” 
(348).
The philosophical ramification of this is that 
“when the ar t of another culture enters into 
attitudes that determine our experience genuine 
continuity is effected” (249) to create a community 
and continuity that do not physically exist, and 
yet are functional and effective (250). Succinctly 
echoing our conceptualized flow from emotional 
feeling to intellectual feeling as the need to justify 
feelings one has acted on as a way to invoke the 
sympathetic imagination, Dewey quotes Shelley 
that “the deed shall breed the thought” (363).
At this point, we turn to William James.
Roughly corresponding to our ideas above, on 
the flow from discursive to rhetorical engagement, 
James lays out an analytical progression of 
the origin, the meaning, and the measure of 
ethical philosophy. These are, “respectively the 
psychological question, the metaphysical question 
and the casuistic question. The psychological 
question asks after the historical origin of our moral 
ideas and judgments; the metaphysical question 
asks what the very meaning of the words “good,” 
“ill,” and “obligation” are; the casuistic question 
asks what is the measure of the various goods and 
ills which men recognize, so that the philosopher 
may settle the true order of human obligations” 
(Introduction, ¶3). Briefly, it seems a feckless quest 
and rather a straw man argument to imagine there 
might be an “essence [that] would be the good 
upon which all thinkers were agreed, the relatively 
objective and universal good that the philosopher 
seeks” (§III. ¶4). Equally problematic is the 
notion of obligation (which is unable to resolve the 
problem of demand) and the problem of conflicting 
demands and the question of who has the most 
valid claim to have their demands met.
William James draws an interesting distinction 
between tr uth and good. “Tr uth supposes a 
standard outside of the thinker to which he must 
conform” (§II. ¶3), while in the search for the 
good, “the real superiority and authority which are 
postulated by the philosopher to reside in some of 
the opinions, and the really inferior character which 
he supposes must belong to others, cannot be 
explained by any abstract moral ‘nature of things’ 
existing antecedently to the concrete thinkers 
themselves with their ideals” (§II. ¶7). James’ 
central argument is that, “ethical treatises may be 
voluminous and luminous as well; but they never 
can be final, except in their abstractest and vaguest 
features; and they must more and more abandon 
the old-fashioned, clear-cut, and would-be ‘scientific’ 
form” (§IV. ¶2).
While James couches his discussion of personal 
ethics in the mantle of the imperative of individuality 
distinct from “any abstract moral ‘nature of things’ 
existing antecedently to the concrete thinkers 
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themselves with their ideals” (§II. ¶7) and Dewey 
sees an esthetics of ethics through the conflation 
of “morals understood to be identical with every 
aspect of value that is shared in experience” 
(362), their commonality in invoking feeling from 
experience as the substrate of morality and the raw 
material of ethics after postmodern thinking (with 
both James and Dewey being durably ahead of their 
times) is most striking.
We now turn to more chronologically contemporary 
thinkers, Richard Bernstein and Simon Critchley, 
in furthering our discussion of how these (to echo 
Nietzsche’s phrases) “knowledge stones” which 
“rumble around in our bellies”—issues of personal 
morality and public ethicality—are individual and 
societal challenges, often succinctly described as 
problems of self and others in the phrase the turn to 
the self. 
　2.5.2　 Richard Bernstein and Simon Critchley: 
Problems of self and others 
In critical response to Bernstein and Critchley, 
in terms of the turn to the self, we begin with the 
following question. How is the attempt to see 
the world through others’ eyes a postmodernist 
dilemma, actually a post-postmodernist dilemma, 
and what can be done to resolve it? 
Richard Bernstein begins by briefly tracing a 
background on the rejection of humanism and 
undertakes to reject that rejection. He takes up the 
“challenge to defend these ‘shared assumptions, 
commitments, and insights’” (2) that people seem 
to wish there to be. Proceeding almost by way of 
hyperbole, he says he does not accept “what has 
now become a cliché among many ‘postmodern’ 
writers, i.e., that humanism is passé” (Bernstein, 
3) and laughable. The key point in Bernstein’s 
enterprise of  responding to the crit ique of 
humanism is stated in the following sentence. “The 
basic condition for all understanding requires one 
to test and risk one’s convictions and prejudgments 
[which Bernstein falls short of calling prejudices] 
in and through an encounter with what is radically 
‘other’ and alien” (4). Bernstein notes both that the 
“primary rhetorical gesture of the ‘postmodern’ 
moment is to be critical … [and that] … there is 
also a questioning, undermining and deconstruction 
of any and all fixed standards of critique” (7). One 
question to consider is why this is such a problem. 
There are two possibilities that Bernstein moots. 
One is that we’re caught in a loop of Habermasian 
and Apelian ‘performative contradictions’ and the 
other is that this dilemma engenders “new genres 
of critique without requiring af firming norms of 
critique” (7).
Bernstein’s position is, “I do not think we can 
any longer responsibly claim that there is or can 
be a final reconciliation” (8) and uses a term from 
astronomy, the constellation, as a metaphor which 
allows disparate elements to nevertheless group 
into a functioning whole, where some concepts 
exer t force fields that attract or repulse other 
notions. On the conjunction of ethical and political 
considerations, Bernstein comments, “Although 
we can distinguish ethics and politics, they are 
inseparable. For we cannot understand ethics 
without thinking through our political commitments 
and responsibilities. And there is no understanding 
of politics that does not bring us back to ethics” (9).
On the question of how we may see the world 
through the eyes of others, Bernstein says “I 
agree with Gadamer when he tells us that ‘in a 
conversation, when we have discovered the other 
person’s standpoint and horizon, his ideas become 
intelligible without our necessarily having to 
agree with him’” (10). Bernstein closes (12) with 
acknowledgement of both the need to resist forced 
reconciliation of ideas, referencing both Kuhn and 
Lyotard as capturing something “in the air” even 
though both their works have a contradictory and 
exploratory feel. Bernstein also acknowledges the 
influence of Rorty (13) in his own work.
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Simon Critchley, in a very non-Rorty frame of 
reference, begins his Infinitely Demanding: Ethics 
of Commitment and Politics of Resistance with a 
species of the “without God what meaning can there 
be to life?” query that existentialism has long ago 
answered. Critchley’s summation of the condition 
of solitar y personal existence in a purposeless 
meaningless  universe is  that  post -Kant ian 
philosophy is a histor y of disappointment. He 
advises that the two forms of this disappointment 
of most urgent concern are on the religious and 
political fronts. 
Critchley presents his point of view in the 
following diagram:
The left side of this char t represents the 
ultimately untenable position we must direct 
our attentions away from. In moving away from 
either type of nihilism, Critchley uses the phrase 
“philosophical activity” to “mean the free movement 
of thought and critical reflection … [as] … militant 
resistance to nihilism” (2). Critchley refines this 
definition as, “thinking through of the fact that 
the basis of meaning has become meaningless” 
(2) “…without bewitching ourselves with new and 
exotic forms of meaning, with imported brands of 
existential balm” (3). He concludes that, “in a world 
that is all too rapidly blowing itself to pieces, the 
passive nihilist closes his eyes and makes himself 
into an island [and that] at the present time [2007] 
… the quintessence of active nihilism is [the 
terrorist group] al-Qaeda [and] … we are living 
through a chronic re-theologization of politics” (5). 
The right side of the chart must then be the proper 
course. 
Critchley states his position with a prescription. 
“What is required, in my view, is a conception of 
ethics that begins by accepting the motivational 
deficit in the institutions of liberal democracy, 
but without embracing either passive or active 
nihilism” (8). He refers to ethical experience as 
the “core structure of moral selfhood” and as 
an “existential matrix of ethics” (9) and says his 
principal task is to develop a theor y of ethical 
subjectivity (10). Thereafter follows an energetic 
attempt to construct, for want of a less-paradoxical 
phrase, an objective system of ethical subjectivity. 
While Critchley engages in interesting acrobatics, 
gymnastics or balletic maneuvers, to elucidate 
his three concepts—commitment,  demand, 
responsibility—needed to create or appreciate 
his notion of ethical subjectivity, the mechanics of 
his system present an unconvincing complexity. 
Working through examples and counter examples, 
what we are left with is a sort of guilty conscience 
arbiter of morality.
Truly, there are gems in the mining Critchley 
is doing. For example, he closes his first chapter 
with two incisive points that present a useful 
role and an accurate description of postmodern 
ethics. We agree with his view that “ethics is the 
disturbance of the political status quo” [and] 
“the continual questioning from below of any 
attempt to impose order from above” (13). This 
is certainly at variance with an ethics predicated 
on maintenance of the status quo. Critchley cites 
moral positions, such as Adam Smith and Hume’s 
concept of moral sympathy, as demands “to which 
the self gives its approval” (17). The problem is that 
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sentiment that “all questions of normativity, 
whether universalistic or relativistic, have to follow 
from some conception of what I am calling ethical 
experience” (23), are perfectly reasonable without 
his triad of commitment, demand, responsibility 
as an envisioning/ explanation/ system of ethical 
subjectivity.
Unsatisfyingly, this leaves us with more of 
a general sense—a thread from inference and 
extrapolation—than as a sine qua non, that seeing 
the world from the perspective of the other is 
entailed in the turn toward the self. While Bernstein 
takes other and alien interests into account as a 
hallmark of the process whereby individuals may 
ever hope to gain self-knowledge and Critchley’s 
ethical subjectivity acknowledges Enlightenment 
notions of moral sympathy as foundational, the 
necessity of seeing the world from the perspective 
of the other is not explicit. Rather, it is incidental 
and what is essential is that one is being a good 
person by behaving in good ways that include being 
virtuous toward others as a condition of improving 
the self. Finally, it may amount to the same result. 
At bottom, the answer to the question “Are you 
helping me because you love me or are you helping 
me because you want to appear to be helpful as a 
way of improving yourself?” may be less important 
than the help given.
　　Part 3:　‌Conclusion: on the weaponization 
of contextualization and the 
vilification of postmodernism: 
How have the stones been 
grinding and how have the 
stones been used and how is 
the gravel being thrown?
In par t, the back-of-our-mind question and 
impetus for this paper was the following question. 
How is confusion about postmodernism connected 
to present-day xenophobia and claims that we 
are living in a “post-truth” era? Stanley Fish, 
in his recent New York Times ar ticle entitled 
“‘Transparency’ Is the Mother of Fake News”, was 
a source of both inspiration and confirmation for 
our limited-selection retrospective on five aspects 
of the postmodern debate—postmodern feminism; 
post-colonialism and postmodernism; the appeal 
to literature in respecting minority voices; the 
question of whether context is the truest “author” 
of the postmodern world; and the all-encompassing 
question of how we may behave morally and 
ethically in light of the work-in-progress status of 
the preceding four areas of inquiry. If we were to 
consider a metaphor to describe our reflections 
on the place of the individual in reconstructing the 
ethical universe after postmodernism, it might be in 
the following question: How may we steer a laden 
cart with provisionally-attached axles—sometimes 
it feels as if the cart is a sledge being dragged—
over a roadway of loosely-packed gravel without the 
wheels being shaken off? And yet, to paraphrase 
Nietzsche from our epigraph, it is the presence of 
these indigestible knowledge stones rattling around 
in the belly that defines the postmodern condition 
in which understanding context is the guiding 
principle for appropriate action.
Fish, in the following extract, uses the phrase 
point of view in describing what we take context to 
entail. He asserts:
Speech proceeding from a point of view 
can at least be recognized as such and then 
countered. You say, “I know where those guys 
are coming from, and here are my reasons 
for believing that we should be coming from 
some place else” —and dialogue begins. It is 
dialogue inflected by interests and agendas, but 
dialogue still. But when speech (or information 
or data) is just sitting there inert, unattached to 
any perspective, when there are no guidelines, 
monitors, gatekeepers or filters, what you have 
are innumerable bits (like Lego) [parenthetic 
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simile added by Fish] available for assimilation 
into any project a clever verbal engineer 
might imagine; and what you don’t have is 
any mechanism that can stop or challenge the 
construction project or even assess it. What 
you have, in short, are the perfect conditions 
for the unchecked proliferation of what has 
come to be called “fake news.” 
We may, in light of the above extract, interpret 
the “bits” that Fish likens to Lego as the “facts” 
(which can also be described as truth claims) we 
analogize as stones. Fish, without using the term 
weaponize, may be interpreted to be arguing that 
“transparency” serves to weaponize opinions by 
placing those of the expert and the bigot on the 
same level. We agree. Fur ther, the notion that 
facts are stones—durable, but not indestructible—
leads to the following question. Whose interests 
are served by the destruction of the truth claims of 
established facts?
The answer is less dramatic than the question 
might imply. Nearing the end of 2018, we seem to 
be at a particular historical moment when phrases, 
like “alternate facts” and “fake news”, are used, 
respectively, to justify one proposition or discredit 
another. Yet, standards of factual verifiability and 
journalistic integrity are clear and well established 
and both can be checked. We are presented with 
the popular notion that we are living in a “post-
truth” or “post-fact” era and Fish comments on how 
“the rise of fake news has been attributed by some 
to the emergence of postmodern thought” (Fish, 
2018). Rather, these notions of postmodernism are 
the result of ignorance about what postmodernism 
actually is. In reply to charges that postmodern 
thought, “derides facts and absolutes, and insists 
that there are only narratives and interpretations” 
(Fish, 2018), Fish counters that:
…insistence on the primacy of narratives 
and interpretations does not involve a deriding 
of facts but an alternative stor y of their 
emergence. Postmodernism sets itself against 
the notion of facts just lying there discrete 
and independent, and waiting to be described. 
Instead it argues that fact is the achievement 
of argument and debate, not a pre-existing 
entity by whose measure argument can be 
assessed. Arguments come first; when they are 
successful, facts follow — at least for a while, 
until a new round of arguments replaces them 
with a new set of facts. (Fish, 2018)
What, then, is the mundane reason for the 
popularity of phrases like “alternate facts” and “fake 
news” when legitimate methods of verification are 
available? On this question, Fish observes, “in the 
brave new world of the internet, where authority 
is evenly distributed to everyone with a voice or a 
podcast, no one believes anybody, or (it is the same 
thing) everyone believes anybody” and concludes 
that “what has brought us to this sorry pass is 
not the writings of Derrida or Foucault or any 
postmodern guru but the twin mantras of more free 
speech and absolute transparency” (Fish, 2018). 
We agree and present a seven-word assessment: 
Lies used for political purposes are propaganda. 
There’s nothing new about propaganda or the 
techniques of deception it employs. We recall 
a 1960s educational game, aptly called “The 
Propaganda Game”, —it taught players 55 types 
and six categories of propaganda techniques for 
use during the game—as throwback proof of just 
how predictable and remarkably not new the 
techniques of propaganda are. As a perusal of the 
list in the notes at the end of this paper will reveal, 
the messages are the same even if the apparatus 
whereby propaganda is conducted is constantly 
updated.
Additionally, we draw attention to expressions 
like “the ethical universe after postmodernism” 
used in the discussion above. The phrase “after 
postmodernism” must be read as after learning 
the lessons of postmodernism rather than as after 
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the rejection of postmodernism. The question 
is one which we frame as more than a search for 
ethical standards in spite of the fact that all ethical 
standards have been called into question, but an 
understanding that higher ethical standards are 
not about edicts and absolutes. The bar has not 
been lowered to a “situation ethics” apology (often 
presented as a justification for doing whatever one 
can get away with) that there are no standards. 
Rather, ethical responses exist to be applied to a 
variety of situations. As Richard Rorty has argued, 
effort and empathy are required. Rorty uses the 
term sentimentalism to characterize the sort of 
empathy required to behave in an ethical manner 
in light of the great variety of ethical standards 
with which we may not agree and which we must 
understand even if we do not respect or adhere 
to them. Sentimentalism, in Rorty’s ethics-after-
postmodernism sense, is the beneficiary of Adam 
Smith’s concept of the flow of moral sentiment from 
the Enlightenment. Again, the result is that a higher 
standard (and the word standard is used here as 
description of the prevailing norm rather than as a 
prescription for a Platonic ideal) of human conduct 
is required.
A variety of schools of thinking, using modern 
textual analysis and postmodern contextual analysis, 
trade ideas and debate methods in their lively and 
productive critique of each other. The question, at 
bottom, is of what historical moment these debates 
are the key to unlocking. How can they reconcile 
current polarities that have transformed lively 
debate into violent vying for a lock grip on single 
and simplistic solutions as equivalently presentable 
and singularly viable approaches? We may trace 
back the quest for best-solution-whatever-the-
context systems and find there are none. We search 
deeper, betting that taking context into account 
will ensure a workable system. We lose the bet; it 
doesn’t provide better accommodation. Instead, 
shallow recourse to the paean for diversity as a 
panacea to entrenched injustices sparks sentiments 
of resentment on one side and impotence on the 
other. Entrenched interests oppose a measure 
toward equalization declaring, “it’s gone too far” 
while disenfranchised individuals and groups 
protest that “it hasn’t gone far enough.”
How did public debate resolve or evolve or 
devolve to bring us to a world so unlike the one 
we bend our creativity toward making? Academics 
may contend that scholarly debate continues to 
challenge the sorts of propagandistic discourse that 
ensue in the polity; but this attempted disconnect 
and suggested dichotomy of society from academy 
ill serves any self or other-defined constituency. 
Intellectual abdication is egregiously irresponsible; 
sound voices are needed in unsound discussions. 
However discordant the din, ideas, which are 
used like stones bashing together, act in concert. 
The clanking has the sound of Sisyphus’ rock 
rolling down the mountain over a bed of gravel. 
The concerted effort is the engine that rolls the 
rock back up. And yet, the concerted effort isn’t 
concerted or coordinated in intent, only in affect. 
Rumblings are like thunder and we ponder how we 
will be engulfed in this squall moment in the storm 
of history. We grapple with practical problems and 
seek compelling conclusions. We see the power of 
the narrative connected to life in the postmodern 
world .  We a lso  see  the promise of  s imple 
solutions sabotaging the necessar y complexity 
in the multifaceted debates where community 
is negotiated and diversity is celebrated for the 
creative energy it brings (rather than savaged 
and reviled as the instrument of the supposed-
concessions it wrings). 
Time and space do not permit conversation on 
Nietzsche’s On the Advantage and Disadvantage of 
History for Life. That must be the subject for a later 
paper, but we also note how his observations on 
there being “three kinds of history: monumental, an 
antiquarian and a critical kind of history” (Loc. 304) 
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may be discussed as entry points to our opening 
remarks on foundation/ Enlightenment, textual/ 
modern, and contextual/ postmodern thought. 
Also to be the addressed in that later paper would 
be Zygmunt Bauman’s Liquid Times, in which we 
see the strong parallel of “passage from the ‘solid’ 
to a ‘liquid’ phase of modernity” as a marker of 
postmodernism.
For now, in this brief consideration, we trust 
that some useful opportunities have been offered, 
some vantage points have been provided, from 
which to reflect on the place of the individual 
in reconstr ucting the ethical universe after 
postmodernism and on the usefulness of what we 
regard as creative non-fiction academic writing as a 
“free” style for presenting diverse works.
* This paper was written in the main by Lawrence 
Karn, with the very kind assistance and support 
of Takahiko Hattori.
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Endnote
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Game [Excerpts]
The reader is urged to review the examples and 
explanations in the listed techniques. For reference, 
below are the 55 titles and six categories of 
propaganda techniques used in Allen and Greene’s 
game, based on the book Straighter Thinking by 
George H. Moulds, published in 1966 by AIM 
(Autelic Instructional Materials) Publishers, New 
Haven, CT.
III. Explanations of Techniques
A. Techniques of Self-Deception
1. Prejudice 
2. Academic Detachment 
3. Drawing the Line 
4. Not Drawing the Line 
5. Conservatism, Radicalism, Moderatism 
6. Rationalization 
7. Wishful Thinking 
8. Tabloid Thinking 
9. Causal Oversimplification 
10. Inconceivability 
B. Techniques of Language
1. Emotional Terms 
2. Metaphor & Simile 
3. Emphasis 
4. Quotation Out of Context 
5. Abstract Terms 
6. Vagueness 
7. Ambiguity 
8. Shift of Meaning 
C. Techniques of Irrelevance
1. Appearance 
2. Manner 





8. Technical Jargon 
9. Sophistical Formula 
D. Techniques of Exploitation
1. Appeal to Pity 
2. Appeal to Flattery 
3. Appeal to Ridicule 
4. Appeal to Prestige 
5. Appeal to Prejudice 
6. Bargain Appeal 
7. Folksy Appeal 
8. Join the Bandwagon Appeal 
9. Appeal to Practical Consequences 
10. Passing from the Acceptable to the Dubious 
E. Techniques of Form
1. Concurrency 
2. Post Hoc 
3. Selected Instances 
4. Hasty Generalization 
5. Faulty Analog 
6. Composition 
7. Division 
8. Non Sequitur 
F. Techniques of Maneuver
1. Diversion 
2. Disproving a Minor Point 
3. Ad Hominem 
4. Appeal to Ignorance 
5. Leading Question 
6. Complex Question 
7. Inconsequent Argument 
8. Attacking a Straw Man 
9. Victory by Definition 
10. Begging the Question   　　　　　
http://www.pnl-nlp.org/download/propaganda/
page1.htm#b
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